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DETERMINISTIC FACTORING WITH ORACLES
FRANC¸OIS MORAIN, GUE´NAE¨L RENAULT, AND BENJAMIN SMITH
Abstract. We revisit the problem of integer factorization with number-theoretic oracles, including
a well-known problem: can we factor an integer N unconditionally, in deterministic polynomial
time, given the value of the Euler totient ϕ(N)? We show that this can be done, under certain size
conditions on the prime factors of N . The key technique is lattice basis reduction using the LLL
algorithm. Among our results, we show for example that if N is a squarefree integer with a prime
factor p >
√
N , then we can recover p in deterministic polynomial time given ϕ(N). We also shed
some light on the analogous problems for Carmichael’s function, and the order oracle that is used
in Shor’s quantum factoring algorithm.
1. Introduction
The well-known fundamental theorem of arithmetic asserts that every integer N can be written
as in a unique way, up to permutation of the factors, as
N =
k∏
i=1
peii
where the pi are distinct primes, and each ei > 0. Making this theorem explicit by computing the
prime factorization of N—that is, computing the pi and ei—is a fundamental problem in algorithmic
number theory. This article is concerned with deterministic factorization algorithms.
Some numbers are easy to factor, even deterministically. For example, if N is prime, then this can
be proven in deterministic polynomial time in theory [1], and more efficiently (though heuristically)
in practice [35]. Prime powers can be detected in linear time [5].
But when N has more than one prime factor, hard work is generally required. In the quan-
tum world, we can apply Shor’s algorithm [41]. In the classical world, the fastest algorithms
are non-deterministic: depending on the size of N , one may use Lenstra’s ECM or the Number
Field Sieve (NFS), the best general-purpose factoring algorithm, which runs in time O(exp((c +
o(1))(logN)1/3(log logN)2/3)) [19]. This complexity explains the success of the RSA cryptosystem,
which is based on the supposed difficulty of factoring numbers with only two prime factors.
Deterministic unconditional methods of factoring are rare, and all have exponential running time
for general N . The first such method was due to Fermat, followed by Lehman [28]; more recent
methods include Bostan–Gaudry–Schost [9] and Costa–Harvey [18], which is currently the fastest
deterministic factoring algorithm for general N . Better results exist for numbers with special forms:
for example, [8] describes a method to factor N = pr1p2 that runs in polynomial time when p1 and p2
are of roughly the same size and r is in O(log p1). This was extended in [17] to numbers N = p
r
1p
s
2
with r and/or s in O((log p1)
3).
The use of oracles allows us to abstract and encapsulate the availability of extra information
about the number N . It is thus a traditional way of trying to understand the difficulty of factoring.
In this work, we consider factoring algorithms with access to the following oracles in particular:
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• Φ: on input N returns ϕ(N), the value of the Euler totient function (see §2.1);
• Λ: on input N returns λ(N), the value of the Carmichael lambda function (see §2.2);
• O: on input N and a with gcd(a,N) = 1, returns the order of a modulo N (see §2.3).
We study the conditions under which these oracles can be used to factor N deterministically,
unconditionally, and in a time complexity better than exponential.
The story of factoring with oracles began with Miller [34] and Long [30], who considered ran-
domized factoring algorithms with access to Φ. Woll [43] explored relationships between number-
theoretic problems including factorization and the Φ and O oracles. Recently, Z`ralek [44] has shown
that iterated calls to Φ allow deterministic factoring in subexponential time, after using Landau’s
algorithm to reduce to the squarefree case as in §5.1. In a different direction, Bach, Miller, and
Shallit [3] showed that an oracle yielding the sum of the divisors of N allows efficient factoring.
Chow [10] has studied factoring with an oracle of a completely different nature, using coefficients of
modular forms; this turns out to be very powerful, since it solves the integer factorization problem.
There is also an important practical motivation for oracles in factoring. In the context of RSA
moduli N = p1p2, the problem of factoring given additional information on p1 and p2 has been
studied since 1985. For example, Rivest and Shamir showed in [38] that if N has bitlength n
and the factors p1 and p2 are balanced (with bitlengths close to
n
2 ), then N can be factored in
polynomial time if we have access to an oracle returning the n3 most significant bits of p1. Beyond
its theoretical interest, these algorithms are motivated by cryptographic hardware attacks: the
oracle is an abstraction representing side-channel analysis revealing some of the bits of the secret
factors. In 1996, Coppersmith improved Rivest and Shamir’s results by applying lattice-based
methods to the problem of finding small integer roots of bivariate integer polynomials (what is now
called Coppersmith’s method [11]). This requires only half of the most or least significant bits of p
to be known to factor N with a polynomial time complexity.
In this article we combine these approaches, applying lattice-based techniques to factoring with
number-theoretic oracles. Our results rely on diophantine geometry, using classical continued frac-
tions and the LLL algorithm in a manner inspired by the cryptographic work mentioned above.
We obtain results include the following:
Theorem 1.1. Assume N is squarefree and has at least three prime factors, of which the largest p
satisfies p >
√
N . Then we can recover p in deterministic polynomial time in log(N) given ϕ(N)
or λ(N).
Proof. See Theorem 5.10. 
Theorem 1.2. Assume N is squarefree and has exactly three prime factors pi = N
αi , where
α1 > α2 > α3. Then we can compute a nontrivial factor of N in deterministic polynomial time in
log(N) given ϕ(N) or λ(N) if at least one of the following conditions hold:
(1) α1 > 1/2; or
(2) 2α1 + 3α2 ≥ 2; or
(3) α2 > (−1 +
√
17)/8.
Proof. Follows from Theorems 5.4, 5.6, 5.9, and 5.10. 
We recall the definition of our oracles, and some associated number-theoretic results, in §2. We
then state the relevant results of Coppersmith and Howgrave-Graham in §3. These underpin our
core results in §4, which solve (generalizations of) the following problem: given N and M such
that there exists a (large enough) prime p with p | N and p − 1 | M , recover p in deterministic
polynomial time. We apply these algorithms to factoring with Φ and Λ in §5, and with O in §6.
DETERMINISTIC FACTORING WITH ORACLES 3
Remark 1.1. Similar algorithms and results hold given an oracle yielding the value of the sum-of-
divisors function σ(N) =
∑
d|N d = N
∏
p|N(1 + 1/p), but we do not pursue these analogues here.
We also note that all results involving p− 1 can be easily adapted to use p+ 1 instead.
2. The oracles
As above, we suppose N =
∏k
i=1 p
ei
i , where the pi are distinct primes and ei > 0. We let ω(N)
denote the number of prime divisors of N (so ω(N) = k above). Recall that ω(N) is trivially
bounded above by (logN)/(log 2), and is of order log logN on average.
2.1. The Φ oracle. Given N as above, the oracle Φ returns the value of the Euler totient function,
ϕ(N) =
k∏
i=1
pei−1i (pi − 1) .
This function counts the number of integers in {1, . . . , N − 1} that are prime to N ; that is, it gives
the cardinality of the multiplicative group (Z/NZ)× of Z/NZ.
2.2. The Λ oracle. Given N as above, the oracle Λ returns the value λ(N) of Carmichael’s λ
function. This is the exponent of (Z/NZ)×, the maximal order of an element modulo N ; so
λ(N) = lcmki=1λ(p
ei
i ) where λ(p
ei
i ) =

1 if pi = 2 and ei = 1,
2 if pi = 2 and ei = 2,
ϕ(2ei)/2 if pi = 2 and ei > 2.
ϕ(peii ) if pi > 2 .
2.3. The O oracle. Given N and a with gcd(N, a) = 1, the oracle O returns the order
ordN (a) := min{r : r ∈ Z>0 | ar ≡ 1 (mod N)} .
Shor’s quantum factorization algorithm applies the Quantum Fourier Transform to construct a
quantum polynomial-time order-finding algorithm, which yields an efficient factorization algorithm
after some classical postprocessing (similar to the process in §2.5 below). This order-finding algo-
rithm should not be seen as a true realization of O, since it is only guaranteed to return a divisor
of ordN (a); however, for most inputs it returns the true order with very high probability. Hence,
factoring with O can give us some valuable intuition into Shor-style quantum factoring algorithms.
2.4. Relationships between the oracles. Lagrange’s theorem tells us that the order of an ele-
ment divides the order of the group, and indeed the exponent. Applying this to (Z/NZ)× gives
O(N, a) | Λ(N) and Λ(N) | Φ(N)
for all N and all a prime to N .
While the ϕ and λ functions may seem very close, it is easy to see that ϕ(N)/λ(N) can be made
quite large. For example, if N = p1p2 where p1 − 1 = 2(p2 − 1) (so p2 is a Sophie Germain prime),
then ϕ(N)/λ(N) = p2 − 1 = O(
√
N). However, the following easy result will be useful to us.
Lemma 2.1. If N is odd, then gcd(N,λ(N)) = gcd(N,ϕ(N)).
Proof. Expanding ϕ(N) and λ(N), we have gcd(N,λ(N)) =
(∏
i p
ei−1
i
)
gcd
(∏
i pi,
∏
j(pj − 1)
)
=(∏
i p
ei−1
i
)
gcd
(∏
i pi, lcmj(pj − 1)
)
= gcd(N,ϕ(N)). 
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Recall that if p is a prime, then the valuation νp(x) of an integer x at p is defined to be the
maximal e such that pe | x. For odd N , we see that ν2(ϕ(N)) =
∑k
i=1 ν2(pi − 1) ≥ k gives an
easy upper bound for ω(N), which may be useful when we have access to Φ (though this bound is
generally far from tight). In contrast, ν2(λ(N)) = min
k
i=1 ν2(pi − 1) gives us no information about
ω(N) on its own—and so neither does ν2(ordN (a)) for any a.
2.5. Randomized algorithms. All three oracles give efficient randomized factoring algorithms.
The key is to find some b 6= ±1 in Z/NZ such that b2 ≡ 1 (mod N) (that is, a non-trivial square
root of 1); then gcd(b− 1, N) is a nontrivial factor of N . Such b always exist if N is not prime.
To find a nontrivial square root of 1 modulo N using Φ, note that ϕ(N) is even, so we can
write ϕ(N) = 2st with t odd. Then, from (at)2
s ≡ 1 (mod N) we can deduce b such that b2 ≡ 1
(mod N). The same relations hold with λ(N) in place of ϕ(N) (though generally with different
values of s and t), so the same algorithm works with Λ in place of Φ.
If we use the order oracle O, then we may need to try several random values of a until we find
one with even order r. Then, with probability ≥ 1− 1/2ω(N)−1, the element b ≡ ar/2 (mod N) will
be a non-trivial square root of 1 and therefore yield a nontrivial factor of N .
Remark 2.1. Folklore tells us that there is a randomized polynomial-time reduction between com-
putating square roots modulo N and factoring N . Rabin gives a precise analysis when N is a
product of two primes in [36, Theorem 1]. To render this approach deterministic (as in [34]) one
needs a bound on non-quadratic residues, but this bound can only be obtained under ERH.
3. Lattices, Coppersmith’s method, and approximate GCDs
In this section we recall some essential results on our two basic tools: Coppersmith’s method for
finding small roots of polynomials, and Howgrave-Graham’s approximate GCDs. We also introduce
some elementary subroutines that we will use to improve the quality of our factorizations.
The Lenstra–Lenstra–Lovasz lattice basis reduction algorithm (LLL) is at the heart of both
Coppersmith’s and Howgrave-Graham’s methods. Recall that if L is a lattice of dimension d in Rn
(with the Euclidean norm ‖ · ‖), then we say that a basis {bi : 1 ≤ i ≤ d} of L is LLL-reduced if
‖b1‖ ≤ ‖b2‖ ≤ · · · ≤ ‖bi‖ ≤ 2
d(d−1)
4(d+1−i)det(L)1/(d+1−i) .
The LLL algorithm computes an LLL-reduced basis for L in polynomial time in d, n, and logB.
Moreover, the resulting b1 is approximately as short as possible: ‖b1‖ ≤ 2n−1minv∈L\{0} ‖v‖.
3.1. Univariate Coppersmith. Coppersmith’s breakthrough algorithms [11, 12] use lattice re-
duction to find small roots of modular univariate or multivariate integer polynomials. The general
principle is to build a lattice of coefficient vectors (h0, . . . , hn) of real polynomials h(x) =
∑n
i=0 hix
i
sharing common roots, and then find short vectors in this lattice using LLL. Some cleverness is
needed to construct small lattices that yield large bounds on the expected roots. We refer the
reader to [33] for a survey on this topic, and [6] for the best complexity result.
Theorem 3.1 states Coppersmith’s main result on solving modular univariate equations [11],
following Howgrave-Graham’s simpler formulation in [24].
Theorem 3.1. Let N be an integer with an unknown factor D ≥ Nβ with 0 < β ≤ 1. Let f(x) be
a univariate monic polynomial of degree δ. Then we can find all solutions x0 to the equation
f(x) ≡ 0 (mod D)
with |x0| ≤ Nβ2/δ in polynomial time in δ and log(N).
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3.2. Bivariate Coppersmith. Theorem 3.2 describes Coppersmith’s method for finding small
zeroes of bivariate polynomials. Unlike the univariate result above, these bivariate equations are
not modular. Subsequent clarifications of Coppersmith’s algorithm appear in [15] and [7], and
extensions to the general multivariate case in [25], [14], [7], and [37]. For Theorem 3.2, we refer to
Coron’s treatment in [16].
Theorem 3.2. Let f(x, y) ∈ Z[x, y] be irreducible, of degree at most δ in each variable, and suppose
f(x0, y0) = 0 for some |x0| < X, |y0| < Y . If
XY <W2/(3δ) where W = ‖f(xX, yY )‖ ,
then we can find all such solutions (x0, y0) in time polynomial in logW and δ.
In this article we will apply the special cases of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 where the polynomial f is
linear in each variable to find divisors of N . In another direction, but using the same techniques,
Theorem 3.3 improves on a result of Lenstra [29].
Theorem 3.3 (Coppersmith–Howgrave-Graham–Nagaraj [13]). Let 0 ≤ r < s < N with gcd(r, s) =
1 and s ≥ Nα for some α > 1/4. The number of divisors of N that are congruent to r (mod s) is
in O((α− 1/4)−3/2). The divisors can be found in deterministic polynomial time.
Remark 3.1. The results obtained by using Coppersmith’s methods are asymptotic: they use lat-
tices of dimensions which tend to log(N). To make these methods practical generally requires an
exhaustive search (see [6] for the best known practical algorithm).
3.3. Approximate GCDs. One of the first applications of Coppersmith’s theorems was to attack
RSA moduli, factoring N = p1p2 in polynomial time given half of the bits of p1. The algorithmic
presentation of these theorems used today is the one due to Howgrave-Graham [24], who later used
this result to solve the Approximate GCD problem [23], formalized in Definition 3.4.
Definition 3.4. Given integers A and B, and boundsX andM for which there exists some D > M
and x with |x| ≤ X such that D | B and D | (A+x), the PACDP problem is to find all such (D,x).
Howgrave-Graham gives two types of algorithms for solving PACDP instances in [23]. The first,
using continued fractions, is described by Proposition 3.5 and Algorithm 1 (PacdCF). The second
approach, using LLL, is described by Theorem 3.6 and Algorithm 2 (PacdL).
3.4. Computing approximate GCDs via continued fractions.
Proposition 3.5 (Howgrave-Graham [23]). Given integers A < B, Algorithm 1 (PacdCF) com-
putes all solutions (D,x) to the PACDP for (A,B) with (M,X) = (Bα, B(2α−1)/2) for any α > 1/2
in deterministic polynomial time in logB.
Proof. Suppose (D,x) is one of the desired PACDP solutions: then D | B and D | (A + x), and
D > Bα and |x| ≤ B(2α−1)/2 for some α > 1/2. Write a′ = (A + x)/D and b′ = B/D; then
a′ < A+B
2α−1
Bα < B
1−α and b′ < B1−α, from which∣∣∣∣AB − a′b′
∣∣∣∣ = |x|B < 12(b′)2 .
The classical theory of continued fraction approximations tells us that a′/b′ must be a convergent
of A/B. Algorithm 1 therefore begins by computing the convergents (this is closely related to the
computation of gcd(A,B), and can be done in deterministic polynomial time [26, 42]). For each
convergent gi/hi, if hi | B then we recover the PACDP solution (D,x) = (B/hi,Dgi −A). We can
stop as soon as hi > B, because such hi cannot divide B. 
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Remark 3.2. The bound X in Proposition 3.5 can be relaxed to B2α−1 (without the factor of 1/2)
if we use intermediate convergents, but asymptotically this has no real importance.
Algorithm 1: PacdCF: Approximate GCD using continued fractions.
1 Function PacdCF(A, B)
Input : A < B
Output: The set of solutions (D,x) to the PACDP for (A,B) with (M,X) = (Bα, B2α−1)
for some α > 1/2 (so D | (A+ x) and D | B).
2 R ← ∅
3 (g0/h0, . . . , gn/hn)← continued fraction convergents of A/B, stopping when hn+1 > B
4 for i = 0 up to n do
5 if hi | B (and hi > 1) then
6 (D,x)← (B/hi,Dgi −A)
7 R← R∪ {(D,x)}
8 return R
3.5. Computing approximate GCDs via lattice reduction.
Theorem 3.6 (Howgrave-Graham [23]). Given integers A < B, and α in (1/2, 1) and β in (0, α2),
Algorithm 2 (PacdL) computes all solutions (D,x) to the PACDP for (A,B) with (M,X) =
(Bα, Bβ) in deterministic polynomial time in logB and 1/ǫ where ǫ = α2 − β.
Sketch of proof. We use two auxiliary integer parameters h ≥ u, whose precise values will be deter-
mined later. The idea is to build an (h + 1)-dimensional lattice of polynomials that are multiples
of A+ x and B, and so have a common root modulo d. Let
pi(Z) :=
{
Bi(A+ Z)u−i for 0 ≤ i < u,
Zi−u(A+ Z)u for u ≤ i ≤ h
and set p˜i := pi(XZ). Finding a small row vector in the lattice of p˜i yields a polynomial with a
small root over Z. The parameters u ≤ h are chosen such that
β <
u(2(h+ 1)α − (u+ 1))
h(h+ 1)
,
in order to optimize the size of the shortest vector found by LLL. This gives an optimal value of h,
close to u/α, for which
β < α2 − α(1− α)
h+ 1
.
It remains to take (h, u) = (⌈α(1 − α)/ǫ⌉ − 1, ⌈hα⌉). 
As noted in [23], the continued fraction (PacdCF) and lattice (PacdL) approaches are subtly
different: PacdCF requires only a lower bound on one exponent α, whose precise value does
not matter, but PacdL requires some relation between two exponents, α and β (or ǫ). We will
encounter this difference in §5.4. Similar phenomena appear in the context of implicit factorization
(e.g. [32, 39, 20, 40]), but in these cases the two exponents can be handled more easily.
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Algorithm 2: PacdL: Approximate GCDs using LLL
1 Function PacdL(A, B, α, β)
Input : A < B and α, β ∈ (0, 1), with ǫ = α2 − β > 0
Output: the set of solutions (D,x) to the PACDP for (A,B) with (M,X) = (Bα, Bβ) (so
D | (A+ x) and D | B).
2 h← ⌈α(1 − α)/ǫ⌉ − 1
3 u← ⌈hα⌉
4 L← the (h+ 1)-dimensional lattice of p˜i-coefficients defined in the proof of Theorem 3.6
5 (v0, . . . , vh)← ShortVector(L) // Use LLL
6 P (Z)←∑hi=0 vi(Z/X)i
7 X ← integer roots of P (Z)
8 R ← ∅
9 for x ∈ X do
10 D ← gcd(A+ x,B)
11 if D > 1 and D < B then
12 R← R∪ {(D,x)}
13 return R
3.6. Refining partial factorizations. PacdCF and PacdL both return nontrivial divisors of N ,
rather than complete factorizations. We can improve the quality of these partial factorizations using
some basic auxiliary algorithms.
• Refine takes integersM1, . . . ,Mk, and returns a sequence of pairs (Ni, ei) with each Ni > 1
and ei > 0, and with the Ni all pairwise coprime, such that
∏
iMi =
∏
iN
ei
i . Refine can
be implemented by iterating the rewriting formula
M1M2 = (M1/d)(d
2)(M2/d) where d = gcd(M1,M2) ;
references start with [2], and faster algorithms are given in [4, 5].
• CleanDivisors takes an integer m and a list of divisors (d1, . . . , dk) of m, and returns
a set of pairs (mi, ei) such that m =
∏
im
ei
i . This can be done by applying Refine to
d1,m/d1, . . . , dk,m/dk, which yields {(n1, e1), . . . , (nℓ, eℓ)} such that
∏ℓ
i=1 n
ei
i = m
k. These
ej are all multiples of k, so the result to be returned is {(n1, e1/k), (n2, e2/k), . . . , (nℓ, eℓ/k)}.
4. Finding particular divisors of an integer
This section describes algorithms that find a large divisor D of N if (D− z) |M for an auxiliary
integer M and some small z. We use the simplest case, where D = p is prime and z = 1, for
factoring with Φ in §5, but we think that these more general results have independent interest.
4.1. Factoring with known auxiliary and unknown difference. First, consider the search for
divisors D of N such that that (D− z) |M where M is given and the small z 6= 0 is unknown. We
can compute such D in deterministic polynomial time by solving a univariate modular equation.
Theorem 4.1. Let N and M be integers, and suppose there exists D | N such that (D − z) | M
for a small unknown integer z 6= 0. Then we can compute D in deterministic polynomial time if
(1) |z| < Nα2−β where D = Nα and M/(D − z) = Nβ .
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Proof. Let y = M/(D − z), so M = y(D − z) = yD − yz; computing the product yz leads to
the divisor D by computing gcd(N,M + yz). But x = yz is the solution of the modular equation
M + x ≡ 0 (mod D), and thus (D,x) is a solution to PACDP. By Theorem 3.1, we can compute x
in polynomial time if |x| ≤ Nα2 , which is equivalent to |z| < Nα2−β. 
Corollary 4.2. Using the notation of Theorem 4.1: if M ∼ N and log(|z0|)/ log(N) ∼ 0 then we
can recover D in deterministic polynomial time provided α > (−1 +√5)/2.
Proof. The hypothesis implies β = 1− α; hence α2 + α− 1 > 0, and the result follows. 
4.2. Factoring with known difference and unknown auxiliary. Now we consider the opposite
case: findingD | N such that (D−z) |M where z is known andM is unknown. In our applications,
for example, z = 1. In full generality, provided z is especially small, say log(|z|)/ log(N) ≈ 0, we
can use Coppersmith’s bivariate method from Theorem 3.2 to obtain the following results.
Theorem 4.3. Let N and u be integers with u 6= 0 and log(|u|)/ log(N) ∼ 0, and suppose there
exists D | N such that (D−u) |M for some integer M = N θ with 0 ≤ θ < 1. Then we can compute
D in deterministic polynomial time if
(2) D = Nα with α >
1
4
(1 + θ) .
Proof. Rewrite the problem as N = x0D and M = y0(D − u), so M + uy0 = y0D. Eliminating D,
we see that (x0, y0) is a zero of f(x, y) = Ny − x(M + uy) = −Mx+Ny − uxy. If D = Nα, then
x0 ∼ N1−α and y0 ∼ N θ−α are both small, and we can use Theorem 3.2 in a deterministic way.
First, as in [15], we let
f∗(x, y) := f(x, y + 1) = N − (M + u)x+Ny − uxy.
Now f∗ is irreducible, and linear in x and y, so meets the conditions of Theorem 3.2 with δ = 1;
and f∗(0,−1) = 0. Assume |x0| < X and |y0| < Y . The crucial bound is
W = ‖f∗(xX, yY )‖ = max(N, (M + u)X,NY,XY ).
Using (X,Y ) = (N1−α, N θ−α) gives XY = N1+θ−2α and W = max(N1+θ−α, N2θ−α, N1+θ−2α) =
N1+θ−α. Ignoring small constants, we want
1 + θ − 2α < 2
3
(1 + θ − α)
which implies α > 14 (1 + θ); the result follows. 
We use Corollary 4.4 in §5.4 to show that unbalanced numbers (having a large prime factor) are
easy to factor with Φ. In contrast, compact N (with all prime factors ≤ N1/2) are harder to factor.
Corollary 4.4. Using the notation of Theorem 4.3: if M ∼ N , then we can recover D in deter-
ministic polynomial time provided D > N1/2.
Remark 4.1. A weaker but simpler result can be obtained using Coron’s algorithm, as in [15, §2]:
if we use f∗(x, y) = N − (M + u)x+Ny − uxy, then α > (1 + θ)/3 is enough to recover D.
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5. Factoring with the Φ and Λ oracles
We now return to factoring with oracles. We treat the closely-related problems of factoring with
Φ and Λ simultaneously here, before treating O in §6. We consider odd N , since detecting and
removing powers of 2 is easy. Ordering the prime divisors of N by decreasing size, we write
N =
k∏
i=1
peii with primes p1 > p2 > · · · > pk > 2 .
The two arithmetical functions we are interested in are
ϕ(N) =
k∏
i=1
pei−1i (pi − 1) and λ(N) = lcmki=1pei−1i (pi − 1) .
5.1. Reduction to the squarefree case. We begin by reducing to the case of squarefree N : that
is, N with e1 = · · · = ek = 1. We do this using Landau’s algorithm (Algorithm 3), which factors
an integer into a product of pairwise coprime perfect powers using either Φ or Λ.
Algorithm 3: Landau’s algorithm
1 Function SquareFree(N ,̟)
Input : N an integer ≥ 1, and an oracle ̟
Output: (N1, N2, . . . , Nr) such that N = N1 ·N22 · · · · ·N rr with each Ni = 1 or squarefree,
and all of the Ni pairwise coprime
2 φ
̟←− ̟(N)
3 g ← gcd(N,φ)
4 if g = 1 then
5 return (N)
6 s← ⌊logN⌋
7 (v1, v2, . . . , vs)← SquareFree(g,̟)
8 R← N/g
9 for i← 1 to s do
10 t← gcd(R, vi)
11 if t > 1 then
12 (vi, vi+1)← (vi/t, vi+1t)
13 R← R/t
14 v1 ← v1R
15 return (v1, . . . , vs)
Theorem 5.1 (Landau [27]). Given N and ̟ = Φ or Λ, Algorithm 3 (SquareFree) returns
(N1, . . . , Nr) such that N = N1N
2
2 · · ·N rr , each Ni is squarefree or 1, and the Ni are pairwise
coprime using O(ω(N)) calls to ̟.
Proof. Let g := gcd(N,̟(N)). Lemma 2.1 shows that if ̟ is either Φ or Λ, then
g =
( k∏
i=1
pei−1i
)
gcd
( k∏
i=1
pi ,
k∏
j=1
(pj − 1)
)
=
( k∏
i=1
pei−1i
)( k∏
i=1
pεii
)
,
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where each εi is 1 or 0 according to whether or not pi | pj − 1 for some j.
If g = 1 then N is already squarefree, and we are done. Otherwise, let R = N/g =
∏k
i=1 p
1−εi
i .
We observe that p1 | R, since p1 divides N but cannot divide g, because it is too large to divide
any pi − 1 for i > 1. If p is a prime dividing both g and R, then νp(N) = νp(g) + 1, and there is a
unique i such that p | vi: we should replace vi by vi/p and vi+1 by vi+1p. This is dealt with in the
loop at Line 9. The primes p dividing R but not g should be put with v1, as in Line 14. 
5.2. Reduction to the case gcd(N,ϕ(N))) = 1. Suppose N is squarefree. If gcd(N,ϕ(N)) > 1
(resp. gcd(N,λ(N)) > 1), then obviously we learn a nontrivial factor of N ; but further, we learn
that some pj also divides at least one of the pi − 1. As a consequence, we get a factorization of N
that can be continued with the number of prime factors decreasing on each cofactor. Thus, we
reduce to the problem of factoring squarefree N where gcd(N,ϕ(N)) = 1 (resp. gcd(N,λ(N)) = 1).
5.3. Products of two primes. It is well-known that we can factor a product N of two distinct
primes given ϕ(N), as we recall in Lemma 5.2. This immediately yields Algorithm 4 (Factoriza-
tionWithPhi2), which factors a squarefree integer N with ω(N) = 2 given M = ϕ(N).
Lemma 5.2. If N is a product of two distinct primes and ϕ(N) is known, then the two primes are
s/2±
√
(s/2)2 −N where s := N + 1− ϕ(N) .
Proof. If N = p1p2 with p1 and p2 prime, then ϕ(N) = (p1 − 1)(p2 − 1) = N − (p1 + p2) + 1; so
s = p1 + p2, and p1 and p2 are the roots of the quadratic equation X
2 − sX +N . 
Algorithm 4: Factoring a 2-factor integer using M = ϕ(N)
1 Function FactorizationWithPhi2
Input : N and M = ϕ(N), where N is squarefree
Output: (p1, p2) if N is the product of two distinct primes, or ∅
2 s← N + 1−M
3 ∆← s2 − 4N // ∆ = discriminant of X2 − sX +N
4 if ∆ is not square then
5 return ∅
6 p1 ← 12(s+
√
∆)
7 p2 ← N/p1
8 return (p1, p2)
To convert Algorithm 4 into an algorithm that takes λ(N) instead of ϕ(N), we use Lemma 5.3,
which shows that when ω(N) = 2, we can efficiently compute ϕ(N) from λ(N). Thus, any algorithm
calling Φ can be immediately transformed into an algorithm making the same number of calls to Λ.
In particular, Algorithm 4 can be used with M = λ(N) · gcd(N − 1, λ(N)) instead of ϕ(N).
Lemma 5.3. If N is a product of two distinct primes, then ϕ(N) = λ(N) · gcd(N − 1, λ(N)).
Proof. Suppose N = p1p2. Write g = gcd(p1 − 1, p2 − 1); then p1 − 1 = gq1 and p2 − 1 = gq2 with
gcd(q1, q2) = 1. Now
λ(N) = (p1 − 1)(p2 − 1)/g = gq1q2 ,
from which gcd(N − 1, λ(N)) = g · gcd(gq1q2+ q1+ q2, q1q2), but gcd(gq1q2+ q1+ q2, q1q2) = 1. 
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5.4. Products of more than two primes. Returning to the general squarefree case, suppose
N = p1 · · · pk with primes p1 > · · · > pk > 2 and ω(N) = k ≥ 3 .
Theorems 5.4 and 5.6 show how we can factor N by solving PACDP instances if the pi satisfy certain
relative size conditions. To make this precise, we set
αi := logN pi , so pi = N
αi .
Clearly
∑k
i=1 αi = 1 and 1 > α1 > · · · > αk > 0; so, in particular, α1 > 1/k and αk < 1/k.
The results of §4 yield conditions on the αi under which factors of N can be computed with
the algorithms of §3. As a first step, Theorem 5.4 and Corollary 5.5 give conditions for efficient
factoring using Algorithm 5 (SplitCF), which applies PacdCF using Φ or Λ.
Theorem 5.4. Suppose ω(N) ≥ 3 and there exists 1 ≤ r < ω(N) such that
(3) αr ≥ 2
ω(N)∑
i=r+1
αi .
Then PacdCF recovers the factor D =
∏r
i=1 pi in deterministic polynomial time using given ϕ(N).
Proof. Write α =
∑r
i=1 αi. The hypothesis implies α > 1/2; otherwise αr ≥ 2(1− α) and α ≤ 1/2,
hence αr ≥ 1, which is impossible. Expanding the formula for ϕ(N) yields ϕ(N) = DQ1−N/pr+Q2
for some Q1 and Q2. If x = N/pr − Q2, then (D,x) is a solution to the PACDP for (A,B) =
(ϕ(N), N) with (M,X) = (Nα, N2α−1), and PacdCF will find (D,x) because α > 1/2. In this
case x ≈ N/D = N1−α, and the condition becomes 1−αr ≤ 2α−1, which yields Inequality (3). 
Corollary 5.5. If α1 > 2/3, then Algorithm 5 (SplitCF) recovers p1 in deterministic polynomial
time after a single call to Φ or Λ.
Proof. This is just the special case r = 1 of Theorem 5.4 (for which α1 > 2/3). 
Algorithm 5: Splitting an integer using PacdCF
1 Function SplitCF(N,̟)
Input : N to be factored using oracle ̟
Output: ∅ or a set of pairs (Mi, ei), with the Mi pairwise coprime and N =
∏
iM
ei
i
2 M
̟←− ̟(N)
3 D ← PacdCF(M,N) // D = {(D1, x1), . . . , (Dℓ, xℓ)} with each Di | N
4 if D = ∅ then
5 return ∅
6 return CleanDivisors(N, {D1, N/D1, . . . ,Dℓ, N/Dℓ})
We can go further using PacdL instead of PacdCF. Theorem 5.6 is the corresponding analogue
of Theorem 5.4.
Theorem 5.6. If there exist α in (1/2, 1) and β in (0, α2) such that α ≤∑ri=1 αi and 1− αr ≤ β
for some 0 < r < ω(N), then we can recover the divisors D = p1 · · · pr and N/D = pr+1 · · · pω(N)
of N in deterministic polynomial time given α, β, and a single call to Φ or Λ.
Proof. Theorem 3.6 will use PacdL given A = ϕ(N), B = N , α ≤∑ri=1 αi, and β ≤ 1−αr to find
(D,x) where D = p1p2 . . . pr and x = N/pr − (. . .) ≈ N1−αr . 
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Theorem 5.6 is difficult to apply directly, because of the subtlety alluded to in §3.5: it is not
enough to simply know that the parameters α and β satisfying the bounds exist, because we need
to use them as parameters to PacdL. On the other hand, PacdL does not need their exact values
(indeed, if we knew the exact value for β = 1 − αr, then we would already know the prime factor
pr = N
αr). If we can guess that a suitable r exists, then we can give a lower bound for αr implying
a lower bound for α and an upper bound for β that allow us to apply PacdL. While the bounds
may be far from the optimal values of α and β, thus yielding suboptimal performance for PacdL,
the solution is still polynomial time, and it allows us to factor some integers that PacdCF cannot.
Definition 5.7. For each positive integer r, we define a constant
αr :=
−1 +√1 + 4r2
2r2
.
The first few of these constants are
α1 = (−1 +
√
5)/2 ≈ 0.618 ,
α2 = (−1 +
√
17)/8 ≈ 0.3904 ,
α3 = (−1 +
√
37)/18 ≈ 0.2824 .
Lemma 5.8. If αr > αr for some 0 < r < ω(N), then r, α = rαr, and β = 1 − αr meet the
conditions of Theorem 5.6.
Proof. Let α˜ =
∑r
i=1 αi and β˜ = 1 − αr; these are the ideal values for α and β when applying
Theorem 5.6. Clearly α˜ > rαr. We can therefore use Theorem 5.6 with α = rX and β = 1 − X
for any X ≤ αr such that 1−X < (rX)2; that is, as long as X > αr. Moreover, 1/2 < rar < 1 for
all r > 0. Hence (α, β) = (rαr, 1− αr) meets the conditions of the theorem for the given r. 
We emphasize that Lemma 5.8 only gives a sufficient condition for suitable α and β. Better
values may exist, and in any case Theorem 5.10 below will improve the bound for the case r = 1 from
α1 > α1 to α1 > 1/2 using Coppersmith’s method. But in the meantime, we can use Lemma 5.8
to turn the proof of Theorem 5.6 into an effective algorithm.
Theorem 5.9. Fix an integer R > 1. If there exists any 0 < r < min(R+1, ω(N)) for which αr ≥
αr, then Algorithm 6 (SplitLLL) recovers the divisor D = p1 · · · pr = Nα of N in deterministic
polynomial time after a single call to Φ or Λ.
Proof. Algorithm 6 tries to factor N by calling PacdL using increasing values of r (up to and
including min(R+1, ω(N)), which in any case is trivially bounded by log2N , though much smaller
values of R are more interesting), with the bounds for α and β suggested by Lemma 5.8. The result
therefore follows from r serial applications of Theorem 5.6. 
For r = 1, we get a much better lower bound on α1 from Corollary 4.4. This gives us a result
already stated (in a simple form) as Theorem 1.1.
Theorem 5.10. Assume ω(N) ≥ 3 and α1 > 1/2. Then we can recover the divisor D = p1 of N
in deterministic polynomial time in log(N) given ϕ(N) or λ(N).
Proof. We have ϕ(N) ∼ N , and (D − 1) | ϕ(N); the result follows directly from Corollary 4.4. 
When using λ(N) instead of ϕ(N) in Theorem 5.10, we can recover p1 in deterministic polynomial
time provided α1 > (1+θ)/4, where θ = log λ(N)/ logN . When θ is significantly smaller than 1, this
gives us a substantially lower bound on α1. However, finding a condition analogous to Inequality (3)
is not so easy for λ(N).
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Algorithm 6: Splitting an integer using PacdL
1 Function SplitLLL(N,̟)
Input : N to be factored using oracle ̟, and a bound R > 1 on putative r
Output: ∅ or a set of pairs (Mi, ei), with the Mi pairwise coprime and N =
∏
iM
ei
i
2 M
̟←− ̟(n)
3 D ← ∅
4 for r = 1 to R do
5 αr ← (−1 +
√
1 + 4r2)/(2r2)
6 D ← D ∪ PacdL(M,N, rαr, 1− αr) // use (α, β) = (rαr, 1− αr)
// D = {(D1, x1), . . . , (Dℓ, xℓ)} with each Di | N
7 if D = ∅ then
8 return ∅
9 return CleanDivisors(N, {D1, N/D1, . . . ,Dℓ, N/Dℓ})
5.5. Products of exactly three primes. We can say a little more for the special case of square-
free N with ω(N) = 3: that is,
N = p1p2p3 where p1 > p2 > p3 .
As usual, we set αi = logN pi; by definition, 1 > α1 > α2 > α3 > 0, and α3 is completely
determined by (α1, α2) because α1+α2+α3 = 1. Lemma 5.11 defines the polygon in the (α1, α2)-
plane corresponding to the domain of validity of the exponents for ω(N) = 3.
Lemma 5.11. With N and αi = logN pi defined as above, (α1, α2) lies in the region of the (α1, α2)-
plane defined by the inequalities
0 < α2 < α1 , α1 + α2 < 1 , α1 > 1/3 , 2α1 + 3α2 > 3/2 .
Proof. The first three inequalities follow immediately from the definition of the αi. For the last, if
2α1 + 3α2 ≤ 3/2 then α2 ≤ (3/2 − 2α1)/3, whence 1 − α1 = α2 + α3 < 2α2 ≤ 2/3(3/2 − 2α1), so
α1/3 < 0, which is impossible. 
Figure 1 depicts the values of (α1, α2) that our methods can tackle, shading in various regions of
the polygon of Lemma 5.11. Each result applies only to the interior of the corresponding region,
and does not apply to points on the boundary lines. We can factor N with
• Theorem 5.4 with r = 1 when α1 > 2/3, so (α1, α2) is in the diagonally shaded polygon;
• Theorem 5.4 with r = 2 when α2 ≥ 2α3, which translates as 2α1+3α2 ≥ 2, so (α1, α2) is in
the horizontally shaded polygon, with vertices (2/5, 2/5), (1/2, 1/2), (2/3, 2/9), (2/3, 1/3);
• Theorems 5.6 and 5.9 with r = 2 when α2 > α2, so (α1, α2) is in the triangle with vertices
(α2, α2), (2/5, 2/5), (1−3α2/2 = 0.415, α2) (which is too small to be easily seen in Figure 1);
• Theorems 5.6 and 5.9 when (α1, α2) is in the dotted polygon;
• Theorem 5.10 when (α1, α2) is in the crosshatched polygon.
The grey polygon corresponds to the zone where we cannot prove deterministic polynomial-time
factorization.
5.6. Numerical examples. We use Algorithms 1 (PacdCF) and 2 (PacdL) to factor various N
given ϕ(N) or λ(N). The algorithms succeed when the divisors of N satisfy the required properties.
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α1
α2
5/18
1/3 2/3
α1
×
1/2
×
2/5 1
2/5
1/2
×
3/4
Figure 1. Cases covered by our results when ω(N) = 3.
Example 5.6.1. Consider an attempt to factor
N = 14300000000000000000000000045617
using SplitCF. The oracle Φ tells us that
ϕ(N) = 12000000000000000000000000038160 .
Applying PacdCF with A = ϕ(N) and B = N reveals that N has a divisor
D = 100000000000000000000000000319 ,
which turns out to be prime; the cofactor is 143 = 13 · 11. In this case, α1 = 0.93082 . . . > 2/3.
Example 5.6.2. Let us factor
N = 14300000027170000072930000138567
with SplitCF. The oracle Φ gives
ϕ(N) = 12000000021600000060000000108000 ,
and then PacdCF with (A,B) = (ϕ(N), N) finds a divisor
D = 100000000190000000510000000969
with two prime factors, and the cofactor N/D = 143. Here Inequality (3) is satisfied for r = 2.
Example 5.6.3. We apply SplitCF to
N = 14300000027170000072930000138567 ,
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for which the oracle Λ tells us that
λ(N) = 100000000180000000500000000900 .
PacdCF reveals a divisor
D = 100000000190000000510000000969
with two factors, 10000000019 and 10000000000000000051 (which we find recursively by computing
putative ϕ values), and a cofactor N/D = 143 = 11 · 13. We see that λ(N)/ϕ(N) = 1/120, and
(α1, α2, α3, α4) = (0.60984, 0.32097, 0.035754, 0.033425) .
Example 5.6.4. Next, consider an attempt to factor
N = 268277631293314788242834971321928533335696453431560393354090095217359233 ,
using SplitLLL. The oracle Φ tells us that
ϕ(N) = 268274948536427486010385526536308497574852756752201586122353237944164160 .
Trying r = 2, and calling PacdL with (A,B) = (ϕ(N), N) and (α, β) = (2α2, 1 − α2) (which
implies lattice parameters (h, u) = (24, 19)), we find a solution
D = 610540229658532834519888426420070208770724882201228981991 ,
x = 23576265633281739760211511675892594424044680 .
In this case, D and N/D have two prime factors each (easily discovered using ϕ(D) and ϕ(N/D)):
D = 16378937069540641432773673229 · 37275937203149401661724906179 ,
N/D = 100003 · 4393970621 .
The exponent vector is
(α1, α2, α3, α4) = (0.400, 0.395, 0.135, 0.070) ,
for which α1 + α2 ≥ 2α2 >
√
1− α2 ≈ 0.7778.
5.7. Using the factorization of ϕ(N) or λ(N). Every prime factor p | N is necessarily of the
form δ + 1 for some even δ | ϕ(N), so we can compute all of the p from the factors of ϕ(N). A
general N =
∏k
i=1 p
ei
i has d(N) =
∏k
i=1(1 + ei) divisors. Though d(N) is on the order of logN on
average, we know that lim log d(N)/(logN/ log logN) = log 2 (this being effective, see [22]). For
most N , then, d(ϕ(N)) is polynomial in O(logN); but there can be exceptional N , and it is shown
in [31] that d(ϕ(N)) tends to be relatively large. For example, N = 1088641 · 39916801 · 958003201
has ω(N) = 3, but ϕ(N) = 226 · 314 · 55 · 73 · 112, a number with 29160/2 even divisors.
6. Factoring with the order oracle
We now consider factoring using the order oracle O. Our starting point is the efficient algorithm
for factoring products of two strong primes which is motivated, proved, and further discussed in
[21]. We then consider extensions of this approach to more general N .
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6.1. Strong RSA keys are easy to factor. Consider the case N = p1p2; for example, N might
be an RSA modulus. One historically important subclass of RSA moduli is formed by products of
strong primes, which are primes p such that (p− 1)/2 is also prime.
Proposition 6.1. Let N = p1p2 be the product of two strong primes, so p1 = 2q1+1 and p2 = 2q2+1
where p1, p2, q1, and q2 are distinct odd primes. Then we can efficiently and deterministically
factor N with precisely one call to O.
Proof. Observe that λ(N) = 2q1q2 has very few divisors: 1, 2, q1, q2, q1q2, 2q1, 2q2, and 2q1q2.
Let a = 2, and r = O(a,N). Now r cannot be 1 (because a 6= 1) or 2 (because N > 5); so,
replacing r with r/2 if r is even, we can assume that r is either one of the qi, or else q1q2. We can
distinguish between these cases by primality testing: if r is prime, then we can return p1 = 2r + 1
and p2 = N/p1. Otherwise, r = q1q2, and we can use ϕ(N) = 2λ(N) = 4q1q2 to recover the factors
using FactorizationWithPhi2 (Algorithm 4). 
6.2. Can we factor general numbers with ω(N) = 2? Proposition 6.1 exploits the fact that
λ(N) has very few divisors when N = p1p2 is a product of two strong primes. We would like to
extend Proposition 6.1 to factor a larger class of numbers with two prime factors without requiring
their prime factors to be strong. It is doubtful that we can find an algorithm for all such N ’s, in
particular if gcd(p1 − 1, p2 − 1) is large and factors mix in the order modulo N , see Example 6.2.1
below. However, when the order is large, we can conclude.
Proposition 6.2. Let N = p1p2 be a product of two primes, and suppose r is the order of an
element mod N . If r > p1 + p2, then we can efficiently factor N .
Proof. Since r | ϕ(N), we deduce that p1+p2 ≡ (N+1) (mod r). If p1+p2 < r, then this yields the
exact value of p1+p2, and then we recover p1 and p2 with FactorizationWithPhi2(N,ϕ(N)). 
Example 6.2.1. Let us give an example of the techniques we can use in the special case where
p1 = 2q1+1 and p2 = 2q2q
′
2+1, with p1, p2, q1, q2, and q
′
2 all prime and all distinct (equality cases
are left to the reader); then r | 2q1q2q′2, and not yet covered cases are
r ∈ {2, (2)q1, (2)q2, (2)q′2, (2)q1q2, (2)q1q′2, (2)q2q′2}.
The case r = 2 is uninteresting, since we can certainly not use a = −1 (mod N). The cases r = q1
and r = 2q1 are easy, since p1 − 1 = (2)r and then gcd(r + 1, N) or gcd(2r + 1, N) yield p1. This
covers the case r = (2)q2q
′
2 in a symmetric way.
For r = q2, we get a
q2 ≡ 1 (mod N), and aq2 ≡ 1 (mod p)1, from which a ≡ 1 (mod p)1 and
gcd(a − 1, N) recovers p1. For r = 2q2, either gcd(aq2 − 1, N) reveals p2 or we are back to the
preceding case with bq2 ≡ 1 (mod N). The same results hold for q′2 replacing q2.
For r = (2)q1q2 (resp. (2)q1q
′
2), no easy conclusions can be drawn. We can look for p1 such that
p1 | N and p1 − 1 | r. Letting pi = Nαi (with α1 + α2 = 1) and r = N θ, we can conclude with
Theorem 4.3 if 4α1 > 1 + θ, which is certainly true when α1 > 1/2 > α2. We are left with the case
α2 > 1/2 > α1. First, note that p1 < 2r. If q
′
2 ≤ q1, then p2 − 1 ≤ 2r which yields p1 + p2 ≤ 4r,
so that we have a few possible values for p1 + p2, from which p1 and p2 are recovered as usual.
Otherwise, if q′2 > q1, write q2 = N
β2 and q′2 = N
β′2 with β2 + β
′
2 = α2. Then θ = α1 + β2 = 1− β′2
and the condition of Theorem 4.3 becomes α1 > 1/2 − β′2/4. When β2 = β′2 = 1/4, we get
4α1 > 2 − 1/4 or α1 > 7/16. Note that when β′2 goes from 0 to α2, the inequality goes from
α1 > 1/2 to α1 > 1/2 − α2/4, implying that α2 can be as large as 2/3 (and α1 as small as 1/3).
Alternatively, we can look for q2 such that q2 | r and q2 | N−p1. Take a0 = N mod r and b0 = r;
we look for d = q2 and x0 = −p1 such that d | a0 + x0 and d | b0. In the notation of §3.3, we need
q2 = r
α with α > 1/2 and p1 = r
2α−1.
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We cannot go further towards completely solving even this apparently simple case. For example,
consider N = 1469 = 13 · 113, for which 144 values of a have order r = 22 · 3 · 7 = 84. In this case
(p1 − 1) | r, but this p1 is too small to be recovered with any of the methods given above.
6.3. The remaining cases. If N is not squarefree, then we might have gcd(r,N) > 1, and thus
a factor of N . In general, the reason why we succeeded in the preceding cases is that the possible
orders were few and also non-interleaving. But when λ(N) has many divisors, r can take many
values, including small ones. Therefore, one base a and its order r will generally not be enough to
split N , let alone completely factor it.
6.4. Factoring when the factorization of the order is known. As in §5.7, we might consider
a modified O that yields not only the order r of a modulo N , but also the factorization of r.
Algorithm 7 shows a straightforward way of making use of this additional information. If N is not
squarefree, then it is possible that gcd(r,N) 6= 1, which gives us an easy factor of N ; (hence the
check in Line 5). Algorithm 7 fails, returning ∅, if a has order r modulo every prime factor pi of N ,
or if r | pi − 1 for all i, which implies that all divisors of N are congruent to 1 (mod r). Then, if
r > N1/4+ε, we can conclude in deterministic polynomial time using Theorem 3.3.
Algorithm 7: Factoring with factorization of order
1 Function FactorWithFactoredOrder(N, a)
Input : N , a
Output: A set of pairs (Mi, ei) with the Mi pairwise coprime and
∏
iM
ei
i = N
2 {(ℓ1, e1), . . . , (ℓu, eu)} ← Factorization(O(a,N))
3 r ← Πui=1ℓeii
4 g ← gcd(r,N)
5 if g 6= 1 then
6 L ← ∅
7 for i← 1 to u do
8 v ← νℓi(N) // maximal power of ℓi dividing N
9 if v > 0 then
10 L ← L ∪ {(ℓi, v)}
11 N ← N/ℓvi
12 if N = 1 then
13 return L
14 return L ∪ FactorWithFactoredOrder(N, a);
15 M← ∅
16 for i← 1 to u do
17 b← ar/ℓi mod N
18 g ← gcd(b− 1, N)
19 if 1 < g < N then
20 M←M∪ {(g,N/g)}
21 return CleanDivisors(N,M)
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7. Conclusions
We have shown a range of partial results concerning the relationships between several elementary
number theoretic functions and the integer factorization problem. In each case, we have used
ideas coming from lattice reduction to improve what was known, while falling short of the goal of
completely proving the sufficiency of these oracles for efficiently factoring all numbers. Even with
more information, such as the complete factorizations of oracle values, we still cannot factor all N .
This may be surprising, but it shows the fundamental difficulty of factoring.
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